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Abstract: This paper examines Mexico’s real wages across its 32 states for the period 1997-
2006. Employing dynamic panel data methods, our estimates for the effects of Mexico’s 
“second wave” of market liberalization on real wages provide interesting results. First, we find 
strong positive effects on real wages from foreign direct investment (FDI) and also positive but 
smaller effects from migration. Second, slightly larger wage effects are observed from 
domestic than from foreign migration. Third, alternative partitions indicate that real wages are 
more sensitive to FDI-related fluctuations across states with relatively lower wages and 
migration levels. Other robustness exercises are provided. 
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Since the mid-1990s the Mexican labor market has been exposed to significant supply 
and demand shocks, first with the start of NAFTA in January 1994, and then with the 
devaluation of the Mexican peso in December of that year. As a result of NAFTA, Mexico’s 
total trade to GDP ratio increased from 34% in 1993 to 64% in 2000. Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflows went from 4.3 billion U.S. dollars in 1993 to 10.9 billion U.S. dollars 
in 1994. Between 1994 and 2006 Mexico received more than 217 billion U.S. dollars in FDI 
(totaling around 40% of its GDP). In terms of migration, following the depreciation of the 
Mexican peso, the net outflow of people went from 412,000 in 1993 to 625,000 by the year 
2000.1 
Economic theory suggests that while FDI shocks increase labor demand, international 
migration would cause a decline in labor supply; both factors leading to higher wages. This 
paper examines this proposition after a period of significant adjustment by the Mexican 
economy to several macroeconomic shocks. In a sense, our empirical assessment of 
fluctuations to labor demand and supply is conducted when the economy is on its path to 
economic recovery amid liberalization of both its financial and trade sectors. Researchers have 
identified the post-NAFTA years as the “second wave of trade and financial liberalization” in 
Mexico, following the entry to the GATT in the mid-1980s as the “first wave”. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1997) studied the latter period and showed that rising inequality in Mexico is linked to 
foreign capital inflows. Examples of the “second wave” are numerous and include, among 
others, Chiquiar (2008) for changes in individual wage regressions between 1990 and 2000. A 
few other papers investigate a longer time span that includes both waves, such as Robertson 
                                                 
1 FDI and trade Figures are taken from the International Monetary Fund database International Financial Statistics, 
Migration Rates are calculated with data from CONAPO, the Mexican government national council of population. 
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(2005) for absolute wage convergence from 1982 to 2002 and Mollick (2008), who explores 
relative wages for two monthly data samples due to data compatibility: 1987-1995 and 1994-
2007. 
To illustrate the development of real wages in Mexico, we observe in Figure 1 the path 
of minimum real wages and manufacturing industry real wage indices since 1980. The 
dissimilar pattern of both real wage measures before and after 1994 is evident. Minimum real 
wages have declined constantly since 1981 with a short period of stability between 1992 and 
1994. Manufacturing real wages seem a lot more consistent with the business cycle; they 
started to decline in 1982, after a significant depreciation of the Mexican peso, and recover 6 
year latter in 1988, reaching a peak in 1994. After the depreciation of the Mexican peso in late-
1994, manufacturing wages declined 22.5% in the subsequent two years but started their 
recovery in 1996 moving up to reach levels similar to those of 1994 by 2003. A third real wage 
measure presented in Figure 1 (available only since 1997) is the daily average real wage for 
workers registered in the Mexican social security system.2 Along with the manufacturing 
sector, this broader measure of the real wage show a more significant recovery of wages with 
an annual average growth rate of 2.3% between 1997 and 2006. We argue in this paper that this 
observed recovery of real wages was related to FDI and migration shocks affecting the 
Mexican economy since the second part of the 1990s. 
Previous studies have shown some evidence regarding the effects of FDI on real 
manufacturing wages. Brown et al. (2004) and Lipsey (2004) review the empirical literature on 
the effect of multinational firms on wages and consistently find that foreign-owned firms pay 
higher wages than local firms. More recently, some studies have challenged this evidence. 
                                                 
2 This measure corresponds to the average wage received by permanent employees registered at the Mexican 
Institute of Social Security (IMSS) in urban and rural areas. This measure is the same we employ later at the state 
level to observe the effect of openness on wages. 
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Heyman et al. (2007) studying employer-employee data for the Swedish manufacturing sector 
show that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than domestic firms but they find no evidence 
that foreign firms pay higher wages for identical workers. They suggest that higher payments 
are caused by differences in workers and firms characteristics. They also find that the premium 
paid by foreign-owned firms is smaller than in previous studies employing more aggregated 
data. Moreover, in the case of firm takeovers, they find no effect or even negative effects on 
wages.  
The effects of FDI on more aggregate real wages, rather than manufacturing real wages, 
have been also explored in the literature. A recent example is Ge (2006) who employs a panel 
of Chinese cities to examine the effect of FDI on urban real wages finding that foreign capital 
inflows have a significant positive effect on real wages while controlling for other city 
characteristics. Also, Axarloglou and Pournarakis (2007) examine the effects of FDI on 
employment and wages in manufacturing employing a sample of U.S. states. They find that 
foreign capital in manufacturing have a weak effect on employment or wages. The effects of 
FDI, however, depend on the industry composition of those foreign capital inflows. For 
specific subgroups of industries the effects of FDI have been beneficial for local labor markets.  
This paper also pays attention to labor supply shifts through state-to-state migration or 
through international migration. We use a new dataset at the state level made publicly available 
by CONAPO, the Mexican government national council of population. This dataset provide us 
with net outflows or inflows of people from or into each of the 32 Mexican states, as well as 
with domestic and foreign migration rates (outflows minus inflows over total population).3 In a 
                                                 
3 Our approach uses these migration measures as regressors in the wage equation at the state level in order to 
gauge labor supply shifts. Dahl (2002) develops a model of mobility and earnings where workers choose in which 
of the 50 U.S. states to live and work. His empirical work uses 1990 U.S. Census Data and confirms the role of 
comparative advantage in mobility decisions. The relative state-to-state migration flows of college versus high 
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paper close in nature to ours, Robertson (2005) analyzes the effects FDI (proxied by 
maquiladora establishments), trade and migration (proxied by border enforcement) on labor 
market integration using data for 6 urban areas in Mexico and the United States. He finds that 
trade and FDI have positively contributed the integration of the labor market between the two 
countries but the increase in border enforcement, a proxy for migration, has negatively affected 
wages in Mexico. A number of other studies have explored the effects of migration on real 
wages in Mexico. For instance, Hanson (2004) uses census data for 1990 and 2000 to examine 
the effects of trade and investment on Mexico’s wages structure following NAFTA. He finds 
that wage differences in Mexico have increased due to the dissimilar access to trade, foreign 
investment and opportunities for migration to the United States. Employing also census data, 
Aydemir and Borjas (2007) observe that Mexico emigration rates are relatively higher for 
workers in the middle of the skill distribution, making the relative wage of workers in that 
section of the distribution also higher. This has, however, reduced the relative wage of the 
workers at the bottom of the distribution. They suggest that, “despite the large scale migration 
of low skill workers from Mexico to the U.S., the wage of the low-skill workers in Mexico may 
have fallen” (p. 666). 
Despite the large amount of literature that assesses the effects of greater openness on 
Mexico’s labor market, little is yet known about the impact of FDI and migration at the 
subnational (state) level. It is well known that inequality across Mexico’s regions is significant; 
see, for instance, Sanchez-Reaza and Rodríguez-Pose (2002) and Chiquiar (2005). It is 
expected that shocks to labor demand and labor supply would affect real wages differently 
                                                                                                                                                          
school educated individuals respond strongly to differences in the return to education and amenities across states. 
Dahl (2002)’s approach is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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across regions.4 Moreover, FDI inflows might put in place additional dynamics by increasing 
the rate of domestic emigration to those states that attract more capital flows, thus requiring 
additional labor force.5 Because of these complex dynamics, additional research is required in 
order to evaluate whether Mexico’s second liberalization wave has had a positive or negative 
impact on subnational living standards. 
This study examines the effect of market liberalization on Mexico’s real wages markets 
across its 32 subnational entities for the period 1997-2006. We pay particular attention to the 
effect of FDI and migration shocks on real wages. Employing static and dynamic panel data 
methods, our estimates provide some interesting results. First, we find strong and positive 
effects on real wages from foreign investment and international migration but larger effects 
from domestic migration than from foreign. This is interesting as much attention has been 
given to the effect of Mexico’s international migration on real wages but little to the flows of 
domestic migration across states, especially of unskilled labor moving from the south to the 
north. Overall, the result on FDI versus migration effects is suggestive of stronger labor 
demand shifts than labor supply, which is in line with strong complementarities between 
capital and labor in production. Second, alternative partitions indicate that real wages are more 
sensitive to FDI-related fluctuations across states with relatively lower wages and migration 
levels. These robustness exercises are discussed in detail below. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset, presents 
some descriptive statistics and political maps which describe the geographical patterns of real 
wages, FDI and migration. Section 3 contains the theoretical foundations underlying our 
                                                 
4 In a multi-country study Paus and Robinson (1997) find no evidence that greater economic openness is 
associated to higher or lower wage growth. 
5 Aroca and Malloney (2006) suggest that this might go the other way around and that foreign investment and 
trade rather reduce the incentives to migrate. 
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empirical model. Section 4 examines the determinants of real wages across Mexican 
subnational states. Finally, section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data 
Data was compiled from different government agencies. Wages were taken from 
Mexico’s ministry of employment (1997-2006 daily average state wages data are available 
from Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social). These data correspond to average daily wages 
reported by the employers to the Mexican Institute of Social Security (Instituto Mexicano del 
Seguro Social) regarding permanent employees registered in rural and urban areas. Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) data were obtained from the Ministry of Economy (Dirección 
Nacional de Inversión Extranjera, Secretaría de Economía). International migration rates, 
domestic migration rates and state population figures were gathered from the National 
Population Council (CONAPO, Consejo Nacional de Población).6 GDP per capita, our proxy 
for labor productivity, was constructed based on national accounts statistics provided by INEGI 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática) and population figures were 
obtained from CONAPO. Ideally, the period covered by this analysis would include some of 
the pre-NAFTA years. Nonetheless, the availability of state wages statistics restricts our 
analysis to the period 1997-2006. 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for our data set. Average wages are measured 
in daily real pesos in 1993 prices. The highest average real wage is observed in the capital of 
Mexico, Distrito Federal (id #9), at $54 pesos, followed by the northeast state of Nuevo Léon 
                                                 
6 For the construction of international and domestic migration flows and rates CONAPO employs census data 
from Censos Generales de Población y Vivienda available every 10 years (year ending in 0) and surveys made in 
between each census from Conteo de Población y Vivienda (years ending in 5). Projections for the years in 





(id # 19) at $42.9 pesos. Average output per capita is also the largest in these two states, which 
is expected given that wages should be related to the productivity of labor. The lowest average 
real wages is observed in Durango, only $26 pesos, followed by Zacatecas and Chiapas, with 
only $26.4 and $27, respectively. The lowest output per capita is observed in the southern 
states of Oaxaca, Chiapas and Guerrero. In our sample, the relation between real wages and 
output per capita is positive and strong with a correlation coefficient of 0.77. A clear pattern of 
real wages and their geographical location can be observed in Figure 2. The political map in 
Figure 2 clearly shows how states with higher than average real wages are concentrated along 
the border with the United States and at the center of Mexico. Sonora, the only northern border 
state that does not observe a higher than average real wage, is only $2.5 pesos below the 
national average. Meanwhile, Campeche is the only southern state with higher than average 
real wages and this is due to the presence of the state company PEMEX. The company 
concentrates a significant part of its extraction of oil and gas from the Gulf of Mexico in this 
state. 
For the period observed FDI represents on average around 1.6% of GDP across all 32 
states. The largest receptor of FDI is the capital of Mexico, Distrito Federal, 8.7%, followed by 
the northern border states of Nuevo Leon and Baja California, 5.1% of their respective GDP 
each. The states with the lowest FDI reception are the southern states of Chiapas and Oaxaca, 
followed by center state of Hidalgo (less than 0.5% of their respective GDP in all three cases). 
Figure 3 shows the geographical location of states above and below the average annual FDI to 
GDP ratio. The concentration of the highest receivers of FDI along the northern border and the 
center of Mexico is evident in this diagram. 
Finally, with respect to migration, in the last two columns of Table 1 we observe the 
average rates of international and domestic migration (outflows of people minus inflows over 
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total population). On international migration, only three states in the country experienced a net 
inflow of people: Quintana Roo (0.79%), Baja California (0.30%), and the capital of Mexico, 
Distrito Federal (0.05%). These states typically receive a considerable amount of foreign 
immigrants due to tourism and business activities. Among the states that expel more migrants 
abroad are Michoacán (1.66%), Zacatecas (1.51%) and Nayarit (1.35%). The geographical 
pattern of international migration is shown in Figure 4. States with more than average net 
migration rates extend all along Mexico from Chihuahua in the northern border to Oaxaca. The 
correlation between real wages and international migration is negative (correlation coefficient 
of -0.45), which is more in line with the idea that those states with higher net migration also 
observe the lowest real wages. This negative correlation coefficient goes against the theoretical 
hypothesis that higher migration leads to a reduction of the labor supply and thus to higher real 
wages. 
The sample correlation between real wages and domestic migration is also negative, but 
with a much smaller value by a correlation coefficient of -0.08. We observe 10 states that are 
net exporters of labor to other states of Mexico and 22 that are net importers of domestic labor. 
Among the main exporters are the nation capital (Mexico, D.F.), Guerrero and Tabasco and 
among the main importers are Quintana Roo, Baja California Sur and Baja California. The 
relation between domestic and foreign migration is positive (correlation coefficient of 0.45) but 
far from perfect.7 Indeed, shocks to labor supply and demand might play a very important role 
across the states of Mexico, contributing to move wages away from its normal level, as given 
by the marginal product of labor. Consequently, considering the effect of not just foreign but 
also domestic migration could be useful to control for the effects of demand and supply shocks 
across states over time. 
                                                 




3. The Model 
 Our model departs from a very simple setup. Labor demand follows Barrel and Pain 
(1997, 1999).8 We assume that production in subnational entity i at time t is given by a 
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function which depends on capital (K), 
labor (L), and a productivity factor (A): 
 
   Yit= Ait Kitγit Litσit       (1) 
 
where capital and labor elasticities, γit and σit, are entity and time varying. 












≡ , we obtain the labor demand: 
1−= itit ititititit LKAw
σγσ                         (2) 
 Labor supply is a positive function of real wage and a negative function of net 
migration (M): 
( ) 0,0;, <>= Mwititit SSMwSL                                     (3) 
 Foreign direct investment, denoted as I henceforth, enters in our model affecting 
positively the stock of capital: 
                                                 
8 A similar derivation of the impact of an exogenous source such as FDI (which should affect the absorption of 
technology) on labor demand can be found in Driffield et al. (2005). More recently, Mollick and Cabral (2009) have 
employed this set up to observe the effects of productivity on labor demand of Mexican manufacturing. 
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( ) 0; >=⇒= kkIKIKK itititit                                           (4) 
 Substituting equation (4) into (2) yields: 
1)( −= itit ititititit LkIAw
σγσ                                                          (5) 
 Rewriting (5) we express labor demand as: 
[ ] )1/(11))(( −−= ititititititit kIAwL σγσ                                             (6) 
 Labor market equilibrium is reached when labor supply equals labor demand, from (3) 
and (6) we have: 
[ ] )1/(11))((),( −−= itititititititit kIAwMwS σγσ                                      (7) 
Labor market equilibrium (7) determines the equilibrium real wage itw .  










































=                                               (8) 
 The expression (8) shows that equilibrium real wage is a function of FDI (I), migration 
(M), and output percapita (Y/L).   
 An econometric specification corresponding to (8) is: 
1 2 3 4it o i it it it ity fdi imω β β β β β ε= + + + + +     (9) 
where: ωit is the log of the real wage, yit is the log of the labor output per capita, βo is a 
constant, βi1 is a estate specific effect, international migration (im) and the ratio of FDI to GDP 
(fdi) in each state, and εit is the stochastic random component. We expect output per capita (yit) 
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to control for productivity differences across states under the idea that the more productive 
states are also those that receive higher real wages. In addition, equation (2) suggests that 
wages are paid according to their contribution to marginal product. Since marginal product is 
not available at the state level, average product of labor may serve as a proxy for the 
fundamental determinant of wages9.  
 Equation (8) also allows us to assess the impact of exogenous changes in FDI and 
migration on real wage.  
























                                        (10) 
Note that )1( −itσ <0, and the denominator is positive, as a consequence the impact of FDI on 
real wages is positive. 





































                                 (11) 
Note that MS <0, and the numerator is positive, therefore the impact of net migration on real 
wage is positive. 
 From the comparative statics in equations (10) and (11), we expect coefficients β3 and 
β4 in (9) to be positive. 
                                                 
9 Output per capita also controls for the effect of the economic crisis of 1995 and the influence of the recovery on 
wages: “the business cycle effect”. 
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An alternative and more general specification of our model, when an open economy is 
taken into account, is stated when we control not just for international migration, but also for 
domestic migration, the real exchange rate and lagged real wages: 
 
1 1 2 3 4 5 5it o it it it it it it itw y fdi im dm rerω β β β β β β β ε−= + + + + + + +    (12) 
 
The model in equation (10) takes into account the effects of real wages persistence or 
stickiness, through the β1-coefficient. We would expect that for the period observed the 
declining rate of inflation in Mexico would also lead to wage stickiness and little flexibility of 
the labor market. We expect the effects of domestic and international migration on real wages 
to be positive as before; that is, a contraction in domestic labor supply would also imply an 
increase in domestic real wages. A real exchange rate depreciation would make the state 
economies more competitive if they are heavily engaged in trade activities. However, the pass-
through effect into prices will negatively affect the value of the real wage since the price level 
would go up, pushing down real wages. 
A serious problem arises when one wishes to estimate the model in (10) using OLS 
since the right hand side contains a lag of the dependent variable which is correlated with the 
error term even if we assume that the residuals are not autocorrelated. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) developed a Generalized Method of the Moments (GMM) estimator that solves this 
problem. Their method takes first differences of (10), removing the industry effects ( 1iβ ), and 
produces an equation that is estimable using instrumental variables. Endogenous explanatory 
variables are instrumented with suitable lags of their own. Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed 
a model in which lagged differences are employed in addition to the lags of the endogenous 
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variables, producing more robust estimations in comparison with the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
method which becomes weak as the autoregressive processes becomes persistent.  
GMM estimations are said to be consistent if there is no second order autocorrelation in 
the residuals and the instruments employed are valid. The most common test employed to 
verify the validity of instruments in this GMM setup is the Sargan (1958) test of over-
identifying restrictions. We employ the system GMM model proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998) to estimate equation (10), as well as equation (9) and a more restricted version of the 
model that only takes into account labor demand:  
1 2it o i it ityω β β β ε= + + +      (13), 
For comparison purposes we start by estimating equations (13), (9) and (12) using static 
panel data methods. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Static Specification 
Table 2 presents the estimations of equations (13), (9) and (12) employing static panel 
data methods. Columns (a) to (c) present the estimates of the model without fixed effects and 
columns (d) to (f) present estimations that include fixed effects. All estimates in Table 2 report 
in parenthesis standard errors which are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. For 
the estimates without fixed effects from columns (a) to (c), output per worker, FDI, domestic 
migration and the real exchange rate seem to be significant and present the expected signs. 
Only international migration presents a non significant and unexpected sign. 
The inclusion of the not-reported but significant state specific fixed effects coefficients 
eliminates the significant effects on real wages of our market liberalization shock variables in 
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the β3 to β5 coefficients: FDI, and international as well as domestic migration. Only output per 
capita, our proxy for productivity, and the real exchange rate, present the expected sign. The 
coefficient for output per capita is larger than unity in this case, suggesting that a 1% increase 
in output per capita has a more than proportional effect on real wages. It is possible, however, 
that the relationship between real wages and the regressors in (5) is not precisely captured 
because dynamic adjustment is not present. 
 
4.2 Dynamic Estimates 
While we are able to deal with autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems in our 
estimates of Table 2, one of the problems we cannot deal with while employing static panel 
data methods is that of misspecification. Due to its construction, system GMM estimates are 
robust to unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity problems. The method employed 
differentiates first the estimated equation removing state specific effects. Thereafter, lagged 
differences and lagged levels are employed as instruments for the level equations. 
Columns (a) to (c) in Table 3 present the results of the dynamic estimations of 
equations (13), (9) and (12). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. Before discussing the results in detail, it is important to check the appropriate 
specification of the model. Our system GMM estimators are consistent only if the moment 
conditions employed are valid. Under the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions for the 
two-step estimations, our estimates do not reject the null that the instruments employed are 
valid under any of the columns in Table 3. In addition, moment conditions are valid only if 
there is no second order serial correlation in the residuals. While rejecting the null of no first 
order autocorrelation does not entail that the model is misspecified, rejecting the null of no 
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second order autocorrelation (and thus of further orders) would imply that the moment 
conditions are not valid.  
All our estimates in Table 3 present significant coefficients and the expected signs. We 
reject the null of no second order autocorrelation for the bivariate model and the model 
augmented for the influence of FDI and international migration in columns (a) and (b), 
respectively. Columns (c) and (d), however, observe no problems of second order 
autocorrelation and we take a closer look at these results. For the model in column (c) first, the 
output per capita presents a coefficient of 0.106 suggesting that a 1% increase in productivity 
results in nearly a 0.11% increase in real wages. The FDI to GDP ratio is positive and 
significant, implying that a 1% increase in the share of FDI relative to GDP results in a positive 
0.25% in real wages. This effect might be the result of both a larger demand for labor and the 
better paid jobs created by foreign-owned firms. International and domestic migration rates 
pose significant and positive effects on real wages, with coefficients of 0.040 and 0.051, 
respectively. This finding suggests that real wages are slightly more sensitive to domestic 
migration than foreign migration. Finally, as in the static model, the real exchange rate has 
negative and significant effects on real wages. We simply argue here that the real exchange 
rate pass-through to inflation results in lower real wages.  
Since according to the descriptive statistics observed in Table 2 states in the northern 
border present on average higher wages, FDI flows, lower international migration outflows and 
higher domestic migration inflows, we exclude in Table 3 column (d) the states of Baja 
California Norte, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas from the sample. 
The results in this column are consistent with those in (c) but the effect of FDI becomes 
stronger. The Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond tests also suggest that the indentified 
restrictions are valid. Output per capita and FDI to GDP ratio coefficients are slightly larger in 
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column (d). This might reflect the fact that the lower GDP per capita and the more FDI 
deprived states have the real wages more sensitive to capital inflows and productivity gains. 
Similarly, international and domestic migration coefficients are slightly smaller and, for the 
case of international migration, less significant than for the full sample in column (c). This 
might also suggest that the positive effect of migration on real wages is less important for those 
states that experience relatively more labor outflows. 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
In addition to taking Mexico’s northern border states out of the sample as done in 
column (d) of Table 3, we check in Table 4 the robustness of our results partitioning the 
sample above and below the mean of real wages, international and domestic migration and FDI 
to GDP ratio. We are particularly interested in observing the effects on real wages of FDI 
demand-related shocks and (international and domestic) migration supply shocks (i.e. 
coefficients β3 to β5). Notice that, for all the estimates in Table 4, whenever significant, our 
shock coefficients present the positive expected effect on real wages. The Sargan test and the 
second order autocorrelation tests suggest that the moment conditions employed in each 
specification are valid. 
Under the columns of real wages, we observe how states with below average real wages 
are significantly more sensitive to FDI inflows, international and domestic migration than 
states with real wages above the mean. Jointly, these results might suggest that states with 
relatively low wages are more sensitive to both supply and demand shocks to the labor market. 
For the partition according to income per capita, the β3-coefficients is higher and 
statistically significant only for states with income per capita above average. The effect of FDI 
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on wages is larger at higher levels of economic development. The effect of domestic migration 
on wages is larger for states with higher levels of economic development. One possibility is 
that people in higher income states are more skilled and thus have their wages moving more 
when they move after searching for better returns. This would be consistent with the results for 
the 50 Spanish provinces by Mauro and Spilimbergo (1999), who find that highly skilled 
workers migrate promptly after a decline in regional labor demand, while low-skilled workers 
drop out of the labor force or remain unemployed for long periods of time. 
Below the international migration columns we also split the sample in those states with 
migration rates above (high migration) and below the average (low migration). Comparing the 
two subsamples we observe that wages in states with relatively low international migration 
(below average) are significantly more responsive to FDI-related demand shocks and domestic 
migration supply shocks. The first result might well indicate that FDI flows favor those states 
in which labor is more stable by creating better paid jobs. The second result simply suggests 
that low domestic migration has a higher impact on real wages across those states with lower 
international migration. 
We partition the sample in a similar way for states with domestic migration above and 
below the national average. As in the case of international migration, we observe a higher 
responsiveness of real wages to FDI demand-related shocks across states with relatively low 
domestic migration but we observe no statistical significant different in the response of wages 
to international migration shocks.  
Finally, the partition of the sample between high receivers of FDI (above the mean) and 
low receivers (below the mean) suggest that the response of real wages to domestic and 
international migration is significant and differ for the two subsamples but the difference is not 
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substantial. We observe only a slightly higher response of real wages to foreign and domestic 
migration supply shocks across states with higher than average reception of FDI flows. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Comparing wages of workers between 1990 and 2000, Chiquiar (2008) shows that 
regions more exposed to globalization exhibited an increase in overall wage levels relative to 
other regions in the country. This paper examines aggregate wages in Mexico for the period 
from 1997 to 2006, which is after the transition period following the floating of the peso to the 
U.S. dollar in December of 1994. At the same time, several forces contributed to making 
Mexico more open to foreign capital in order to complement trade-related activities spurred by 
the NAFTA agreement. It is also well-known that international migration (legal and illegal) to 
the U.S. has intensified over the period, likely to be a response to better returns to labor and 
working conditions relative to the cost of moving. 
The view in this paper is therefore that the equilibrium wage rate (determined in theory 
by the marginal product of labor) is simultaneously affected by labor demand and labor supply 
forces, captured by FDI inflows and migration, respectively. We investigate the role of FDI 
inflows into Mexico as capturing forces in the capital market as well as migration movements 
within Mexico and between Mexico and the U.S. to gauge the labor market dynamics. In 
contrast to Robertson (2005), who used border enforcement hours by U.S. border patrol when 
measuring (illegal) international migration, we use recently available data from Mexico’s 
CONAPO that provides a new perspective on this issue. Our findings indicate very strong and 
positive effects on real wages from foreign investment and smaller effects from migration 
(with slightly larger effects from domestic than from foreign migration). Alternative partitions 
of our sample shed additional light on these central results but the conclusion for this panel 
21 
 
study of 32 Mexican states is that factors from labor demand are likely the ones driving wages 
in Mexico. The direct policy implication of this study is that real wages will increase in Mexico 
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Figure 1. Real Wage and Minimum Wage Behavior 
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id state Real Wage Output per capita






w y fdi im dm
1 Aguascalientes 33.6             17,918    1.2 0.44 -0.49
2 Baja California 39.0             19,208    5.1 -0.30 -1.11
3 Baja California Sur 37.0             18,397    4.3 0.33 -1.57
4 Campeche 39.7             23,185    0.2 0.39 -0.22
5 Chiapas 27.0             6,323      0.0 0.22 0.35
6 Chihuahua 34.9             20,910    3.5 0.68 -0.22
7 Coahuila 34.8             20,726    1.0 0.39 -0.02
8 Colima 32.6             15,123    0.3 0.54 -0.55
9 Distrito Federal 54.0             36,455    8.7 -0.05 0.93
10 Durango 26.0             12,912    0.9 0.96 0.18
11 Guanajuato 30.5             11,313    0.6 1.17 -0.05
12 Guerrero 30.8             7,720      0.2 1.20 0.41
13 Hidalgo 31.6             8,965      0.1 1.05 -0.27
14 Jalisco 35.7             14,487    1.6 0.60 -0.02
15 México 40.8             11,752    1.8 0.30 -0.31
16 Michoacán 31.9             8,615      0.2 1.66 0.08
17 Morelos 37.1             13,335    1.2 0.84 -0.39
18 Nayarit 27.6             8,801      1.6 1.35 -0.26
19 Nuevo León 42.9             26,083    5.1 0.30 -0.28
20 Oaxaca 29.4             6,213      0.0 1.12 0.23
21 Puebla 35.7             10,004    2.3 0.45 -0.01
22 Querétaro 42.1             17,277    1.4 0.30 -0.67
23 Quintana Roo 31.8             21,801    1.3 -0.79 -1.78
24 San Luis Potosí 33.1             11,085    1.0 0.90 0.06
25 Sinaloa 28.2             11,829    0.3 0.93 0.32
26 Sonora 31.4             17,952    1.5 0.53 -0.10
27 Tabasco 31.4             8,910      0.7 0.42 0.39
28 Tamaulipas 36.1             15,892    2.2 0.58 -0.49
29 Tlaxcala 32.2             7,935      0.8 0.33 -0.27
30 Veracruz 32.5             8,753      0.2 0.58 0.37
31 Yucatán 27.6             11,655    0.5 0.01 -0.07
32 Zacatecas 26.4             8,690      0.2 1.51 0.11
Average 33.9                14,382.0    1.6 0.59 -0.18
Correlation (W/P, X)                         - 0.77           0.8 -0.45 -0.08
Note: Migration rates are calculated as the difference between outflows and inflows of people over total population. Correlations 
are calculated between real wages averages and its cross sectional average determinants.
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Table 2. Mexico Real wage determinants in the post NAFTA era: Static Model 
                 
ωit = β0 + β1i + β2 yit + β3 fdiit + β4 imit + β5 dmit + β6 rert + εit  
                 
Coefficients (a) (b) (c)  (d) (e) (f) 
β0   0.889*** 1.597*** 1.925***  -8.542*** -8.539*** -6.997***
    (0.231) (0.263) (0.278)  (0.517) (0.522) (0.587)
                 
β2   0.276*** 0.199*** 0.205***  1.231*** 1.231*** 1.096***
  (0.025) (0.028) (0.027)  (0.053) (0.053) (0.058)
           
β3    2.313*** 2.148***   0.136 0.041
   (0.453) (0.436)   (0.248) (0.249)
           
β4    -0.013 -0.026   -0.022 -0.001
     (0.022) (0.021)   (0.025) (0.038)
            
β5     0.033**    0.038
      (0.016)    (0.051)
           
β6     -0.005***    -0.003***
      (0.001)    (0.000)
           
R2   0.423 0.472 0.527  0.423 0.425 0.441
           
Note: Logarithms are taken on real wages and output per capita. The Table reports Newey-West standard errors robust to 




Table 3. Mexico Real wage determinants in the post NAFTA era: Dynamic Model 
          
ωit = β0 + β1 wit-1 + β2 yit + β3 fdiit + β4 imit + β5 dmit + β6 rert + εit  
           
Coefficient (a) (b) (c) (d)
        
β1 0.897*** 0.899*** 0.868*** 0.878***
   (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022)
β2 0.120*** 0.144*** 0.106*** 0.112***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029)
β3  0.470*** 0.251*** 0.340***
 (0.117) (0.076) (0.100)
β4  0.058*** 0.040** 0.039*
   (0.018) (0.017) (0.021)
β5   0.051*** 0.045***
     (0.014) (0.013)
β6   -0.003*** -0.003***
     (0.000) (0.000)
β0 -0.755*** -1.028*** -0.327 -0.417*
  (0.232) (0.248) (0.200) (0.229)
      
Sargan 31.971 31.923 31.56 25.439
  (0.276) (0.278) (0.293) (0.604)
AB(1) -1.996 -2.751 -4.76 -4.034
  (0.046) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
AB(2) -3.064 -2.774 0.30 -0.637
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.763) (0.524)
       
N 288 288 288 234
       
Notes: Logarithms are taken on real wages and output per capita. The Table reports first-step System GMM robust 
estimators as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The Sargan test reports that under the null the overidentified 
restrictions are valid. AB (1) and AB (2) correspond to the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation, under the null 
of no autocorrelation. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels 
of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Partitions of the Sample Above and Below the Mean  
                    
ωit = β0 + β1 wit-1 + β2 yit + β3 fdiit + β4 imit + β5 dmit + β6 rert + εit  
                                  
Coeff.   Real Wage   Income Per Capita   International Migration   Domestic Migration   FDI to GDP ratio 
  Above    Below   Above    Below   Above    Below   Above    Below   Above    Below 
β0   0.173 -0.270   -0.890**   -0.586**   -0.139   -0.271   -0.011   0.198   -0.623**   -0.202 
    (0.317) (0.250)   (0.398)   (0.238)   (0.177)   (0.368)   (0.225)   (0.159)   (0.309)   (0.168) 
β1   0.800***  0.924***   0.779***   0.890***   0.921***   0.819***   0.909***   0.845***   0.819***   0.895*** 
     (0.018) (0.028)   (0.041)   (0.031)   (0.032)   (0.026)   (0.026)   (0.031)   (0.048)   (0.020) 
β2   0.082***  0.080**   0.197***   0.130***   0.063***   0.120***   0.056*   0.063***   0.157***   0.083*** 
  (0.029) (0.034)   (0.049)   (0.036)   (0.022)   (0.039)   (0.029)   (0.014)   (0.038)   (0.021) 
β3   0.169** 0.583**   0.225**   -0.138   -0.041   0.264***   0.209   0.227**   0.214***   0.185 
  (0.070) (0.251)   (0.112)   (0.210)   (0.282)   (0.058)   (0.132)   (0.109)   (0.066)   (0.286) 
β4   0.007 0.036**   0.025   0.011   0.061*   0.011   0.034   0.007   0.039*   0.035** 
    (0.019) (0.016)   (0.022)   (0.025)   (0.033)   (0.019)   (0.022)   (0.009)   (0.023)   (0.018) 
β5   0.035 0.042***   0.059***   -0.013   0.021   0.055***   -0.007   0.021*   0.057***   0.045*** 
     (0.023) (0.016)   (0.014)   (0.032)   (0.033)   (0.017)   (0.036)   (0.012)   (0.017)   (0.015) 
β6   -0.003***  -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.003*** 
     (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
                                        
Sargan   12.781 18.135   13.763   17.571   12.335   18.749   16.851   14.506   9.561   21.821 
    (0.998) (0.923)   (0.989)   (0.936)   (0.995)   (0.906)   (0.952)   (0.984)   (0.999)   (0.790) 
AB(1)   -3.25 -3.424   -3.4339   -3.6352   -3.2164   -3.5246   -3.5304   -3.3318   -2.9737   -3.74327 
    (0.000) (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
AB(2)   0.77908 -1.142   2.18   -0.8786   0.10988   0.39719   -0.60434   0.41898   1.838   -0.7806 
    (0.436) (0.253)   (0.029)   (0.380)   (0.913)   (0.691)   (0.546)   (0.675)   (0.066)   (0.435) 
                               
Notes: Logarithms are taken on real wages and output per capita. The Table reports  first-step System GMM robust estimators as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The 
Sargan test reports that under the null the overidentified restrictions are valid. AB (1) and AB (2) correspond to the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation, under the null of no 
autocorrelation. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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